

Message Text

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USMISSION NATO PRIORITY

INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS

CINCLANT

CINCUSAREUR

CINCUSNAVEUR

CINCUSAFE

USCINCEUR

USNMR SHAPE

USDELMC

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E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: MPOL, NATO

SUBJECT: MINISTERIAL GUIDANCE

REF: LONDON 13884

1. FOLLOWING ARE TEXTS OF PARAGRAPHS 26 AND 29, PREVIOUSLY
NOTED AS "TO BE FURNISHED," AND A REVISION OF PARA 30(B)
ON THE CONVENTIONAL BALANCE. PARA 26 INCORPORATES OLD PARA

27. SUGGEST YOU IMMEDIATELY CIRCULATE THEM TO OTHER
DELEGATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL STAFF FOR INSERTION IN U.S.
CONTRIBUTION TO THE FORMULATION OF MINISTERIAL GUIDANCE,
AND ASK THAT THEY BE TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION IN PREPARA-

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TIONS FOR DISCUSSION OF KEY ELEMENTS OF MINISTERIAL

GUIDANCE BY MINISTERS.

2. FYI: THESE PARTICULAR PARAGRAPHS ARE MEANT TO REASSURE ALLIES AS TO CONTINUED U.S. ADHERENCE TO THE NATO TRIAD AND COMMITMENT OF NUCLEAR FORCES TO THE ALLIANCE. OTHER "TO BE FURNISHED" PARAGRAPHS WILL FOLLOW IN SUBSEQUENT MESSAGES, BUT WE THOUGHT IT IMPORTANT TO TABLE THESE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. THESE PARAGRAPHS DO NOT REPRESENT ULTIMATE POSSIBLE COMPROMISES WITH ALLIES OR RECONCILIATION WITH DRAFT MILITARY APPRECIATION, BUT A FIRM U.S. POSITION TOWARD MINISTERIAL DISCUSSION IN DECEMBER. THEY SHOULD

NOT BE JUDGED TOTALLY ON ACCEPTABILITY TO ALLIES, BUT ON THEIR CONTRIBUTION TO DEFINING A LONG RANGE DEFENSE CONCEPT FOR NATO. END FYI.

3. BEGIN TEXTS.

26. STRATEGY AND NATO FORCES.

A. THE AIM OF NATO'S AGREED STRATEGY AND MILITARY PLANNING IS TO ENSURE SECURITY THROUGH DETERRENCE. THE PRIMARY AIM IS TO DETER AN ATTACK BEFORE IT IS LAUNCHED. IN AN ERA OF BROAD STRATEGIC NUCLEAR PARITY, DETERRENCE TO ALL FORMS OF AGGRESSION MUST DEPEND ON THE MUTUALLY SUPPORTING TRIAD OF STRATEGIC NUCLEAR, THEATRE NUCLEAR, AND CONVENTIONAL FORCE CAPABILITIES.

B. DETERRENCE IS BEST SERVED BY PERCEPTEBLE BALANCES BETWEEN NATO'S FORCES AND THOSE OF THE WARSAW PACT, AND A PERCEPTEBLE CAPABILITY TO CARRY OUT NATO'S DEFENSIVE MISSIONS. AS THE SOVIET UNION REACHES NUCLEAR PARITY WITH THE UNITED STATES, DETERRENCE WILL BE STRONGLY REINFORCED IF THERE IS A ROUGH BALANCE OF CONVENTIONAL AS WELL AS OF NUCLEAR FORCES. IN MANY CASES, IT IS NOT NECESSARY TO MATCH THE WARSAW PACT IN ALL RESPECTS, IN VIEW INTER ALIA OF LOGISTIC AND MOBILIZATION ADVANTAGES OF DEFENDING IN PLACE. IN SOME CASES, AS FOR MARITIME FORCES, NATO MAY HAVE A MORE DEMANDING MISSION THAN THE PACT, AND MAY THEREFORE NEED TO CONTINUE TO RETAIN A GREATER CAPABILITY THAN THE PACT.

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C. SHOULD DETERRENCE FAIL, THE ALLIANCE MUST BE ABLE TO RESPOND IN AN APPROPRIATE MANNER TO AGGRESSION OF ANY KIND. THE MILITARY AIM IS TO PRESERVE OR RESTORE THE INTEGRITY OF THE NATO AREA BY EMPLOYING SUCH FORCES AS MAY BE NECESSARY WITHIN THE CONCEPT OF FORWARD DEFENSE. THE ALLIANCE MUST BE PREPARED TO USE ANY FORCE CAPABILITIES AT ITS DISPOSAL, INCLUDING NUCLEAR WEAPONS, EITHER IN THE CONTEXT OF DIRECT DEFENSE OR DELIBERATE

ESCALATION, TO BRING HOME TO THE OTHER SIDE WITH UNMIS-TAKABLE FORCE THE RISKS OF CONTINUED AGGRESSION AND TO PROMOTE THE EARLY AND FAVORABLE TERMINATION OF HOSTILITIES.

29. THE BALANCE AND ROLES OF THEATRE NUCLEAR FORCES.

A. NATO'S THEATRE NUCLEAR WEAPONS (I.E., NUCLEAR WEAPONS DEPLOYED IN EUROPE) REMAIN AN ESSENTIAL PART OF THE NATO TRIAD OF CONVENTIONAL, THEATRE NUCLEAR, AND STRATEGIC NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES. (INSERT ASTERISK.)

ASTERISK DETAILS AT END OF MESSAGE. NATO HAS MAINTAINED

THEATRE NUCLEAR FORCES WHICH ARE MORE MODERN, DIVERSE, AND NUMEROUS THAN THOSE OF THE WARSAW PACT

ALTHOUGH THE PACT HAS SIZABLE THEATRE NUCLEAR FORCES ITSELF, ALONG WITH NON-CENTRAL SYSTEMS IN THE USSR. GIVEN THE ENORMOUS DESTRUCTIVE POTENTIAL OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, IT REMAINS OF GREAT IMPORTANCE TO DETER A NUCLEAR CONFLICT, AND THUS NATO MUST CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN A THEATRE NUCLEAR CAPABILITY, IN SATISFACTORY BALANCE WITH THAT OF THE PACT. THE SIZE AND MIX OF WEAPONS IN NATO'S NUCLEAR STOCKPILE SHOULD, HOWEVER, BE THE SUBJECT OF CONTINUING REEXAMINATION.

B. THE PRIMARY PURPOSES OF NATO'S THEATRE NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES IN EUROPE ARE (1) TO DETER THE WARSAW PACT FROM USING NUCLEAR WEAPONS, (2) TO ADD TO THE DETERRENCE OF CONVENTIONAL ATTACKS PROVIDED BY CONVENTIONAL FORCES; (3) SHOULD DETERRENCE FAIL, TO PROVIDE A SOURCE OF NUCLEAR OPTIONS WHICH ARE LIMITED AND CONSTRAINED YET, WHICH MAKE AN EFFECTIVE CONTRIBUTION TO NATO DEFENSE. NATO'S CLEAR AND EVIDENT WILLINGNESS AND ABILITY TO USE THEATRE NUCLEAR WEAPONS WHEN NECESSARY IN THE EVENT OF HOSTILITIES CONTRIBUTE GREATLY TO DETERRENCE. WHILE CONVENTIONAL

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FORCES OF THE ALLIANCE SHOULD BE CONSIDERED THE PRIMARY DETERRENT OF, AND DEFENSE AGAINST, CONVENTIONAL ATTACKS, NEVERTHELESS THEATRE NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES ADD TO THE DETERRENCE OF CONVENTIONAL ATTACKS BY POSING A THREAT TO THE MASSING OF WARSAW PACT FORCES AND BY PROVIDING AN IMPORTANT HEDGE AGAINST SIGNIFICANTLY WORSE CIRCUMSTANCES THAN EXPECTED, SUCH AS A MAJOR WARSAW PACT BREAK-THROUGH.

C. DETERRENCE AND STABILITY ARE STRENGTHENED WHEN THEATRE NUCLEAR FORCES ARE SURVIVABLE, NOT ONLY UNDER WARNING AND INCREASED READINESS CONDITIONS BUT ALSO UNDER SURPRISE ATTACK. CREDIBILITY IS ENHANCED IF THEY HAVE THE FLEXIBILITY AND CONTROLLABILITY WHICH ALLOW MEASURED, LIMITED EMPLOYMENT, WITHOUT EXCESSIVE COLLATERAL DAMAGE,

AT ANY LEVEL OF CONFLICT AT WHICH THEY MAY BE USED, THUS TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE CONTROL OF ESCALATION. THEY SHOULD PROVIDE SIGNIFICANT ADVANTAGES OVER CONVENTIONAL ALTERNATIVES. CONTINUED EXAMINATION IS NECESSARY OF CONCEPTS FOR POSSIBLE EMPLOYMENT, STOCKPILES, AND POSTURE TO SEE IF ESSENTIAL CRITERIA ALONG THESE LINES ARE MET. STEPS SHOULD CONTINUE TO BE TAKEN TO INCREASE THE SURVIVABILITY OF THOSE PRESENT SYSTEMS WHICH MAY BE FOUND UNACCEPTABLY

VULNERABLE UNDER SPECIFIC CONDITIONS OF ATTACK. COMPONENTS OF THE FORCES WHICH DO NOT MEET ESSENTIAL CRITERIA OF MILITARY UTILITY, SURVIVABILITY, SIGNIFICANT ADVANTAGE OVER CONVENTIONAL ALTERNATIVES, AND FLEXIBILITY SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR RETIREMENT OR REPLACEMENT WITH WEAPONS AND SYSTEMS WHICH DO MEET THE CRITERIA.

D. CONTINUED PARTICIPATION OF NATO COUNTRIES IN NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAMS OF COOPERATION IS VISIBLE EVIDENCE OF ALLIANCE SOLIDARITY AND THUS CONTRIBUTES TO DETERRENCE, ALTHOUGH IT SHOULD BE RECOGNIZED THAT POSSESSION OF AN EXTENSIVE RANGE OF NUCLEAR-CAPABLE WEAPONS SYSTEMS MAY NOT BE POSSIBLE FOR EACH PARTICIPATING COUNTRY IF MOST EFFICIENT USE OF RESOURCES IS TO BE MADE. PARTICIPATION IN THE NUCLEAR PLANNING AFFAIRS OF THE ALLIANCE, IN FORUMS SUCH AS IN THE NDAC/NPG, ALSO CONTRIBUTES TO ALLIANCE SOLIDARITY.

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30 B. FOR THIS REASON, THE CONVENTIONAL FORCES OF THE ALLIANCE REMAIN AN ESSENTIAL LEG OF THE NATO TRIAD, AND SHOULD BE CONSIDERED THE PRIMARY DETERRENT AND DEFENSE AGAINST PLAUSIBLE CONVENTIONAL ATTACKS, BACKED BY THE THEATRE AND STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES OF THE ALLIANCE. WHILE THE ALLIANCE SHOULD FEEL SOME CONFIDENCE IN THE ABILITY OF ITS CONVENTIONAL FORCES TO HOLD FAR FORWARD AGAINST PLAUSIBLE CONVENTIONAL ATTACK OF THE WARSAW PACT, ESPECIALLY IF CONTINUING IMPROVEMENTS ARE MADE TO THE FORCES, THERE REMAIN OBJECTIVE DISPARITIES IN THE NGA BETWEEN THE FORCES OF THE TWO SIDES THAT PERMIT NO RELAXATION OF DEFENSE EFFORTS OR UNILATERAL REDUCTIONS OF FORCES, AND MAY PLACE THE CAPABILITY TO HOLD FAR FORWARD IN DOUBT IF THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF AN ATTACK WERE SIGNIFICANTLY WORSE THAN EXPECTED. RECTIFICATION OF THESE OBJECTIVE DISPARITIES IS ALSO BEING PURSUED IN THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS. IN PUBLIC PRESENTATIONS, THE ALLIANCE SHOULD CALL CONTINUING ATTENTION TO THESE DISPARITIES AS A JUSTIFICATION FOR THE CONTINUING EFFORTS TO MAINTAIN AND IMPROVE FORCES, WHILE STILL EXPRESSING CONFIDENCE IN THE DETERRENT AND DEFENSIVE VALUE OF CONVENTIONAL FORCES

WITHIN THE TRIAD. END TEXT. ASTERISK FROM PARA. 29.:

THE TERM "THEATRE NUCLEAR" IS USED HERE IN PREFERENCE TO "TACTICAL NUCLEAR," IN ORDER TO REFER SPECIFICALLY TO WEAPONS DEPLOYED IN THE EUROPEAN THEATRE, AND TO RECOGNIZE THE GERMAN POINT THAT THESE WEAPONS COULD BE USED EITHER "TACTICALLY" OR "STRATEGICALLY."

4. FOR LONDON: PLEASE PASS COPIES OF THESE TEXTS TO TICKELL (FCO) AS PARTIAL RESPONSE TO HIS QUERY REPORTED LONDON 13884. OTHER "TO BE FURNISHED" PARAGRAPH WILL BE PROVIDED SHORTLY, WHICH TOGETHER WITH THESE TEXTS WILL CONSTITUTE REVISED U.S. DRAFT. INGERSOLL

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